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CHAPTER 13 
NATION STATE, CONFLICT 
RESOLUTION, AND 
CULTURE WAR, 1850-1878 
SIEGFRIED WEICHLEIN 
RITUALs combine past and present. At least this is the intention of their protagonists. 
During the nineteenth century, this was particularly true for monarchs whose rule had 
always been symbolically charged. The French king of the restoration, Charles X, had 
himself crowned like a medieval monarch in the Cathedral of Reims on 31 May 1825. 
This event was followed by a ceremony of healing the sick in the tradition of the 'rais 
thaumaturges,' with Charles X speaking the traditional formula used to eure those · 
suffering from scrofula: 'Le rai te tauche, Dieu te guerisse' ('the king touches you, may 
the Lord heal you'). 1 Charles X possessed, however, as much faith in modern science as 
in divine assistance, as three ofhis personal physicians were present at the ceremony to 
look after the siele. On 18 October 1861, King Wilhelm I of Prussia, who had a 
monarchic family history of a mere 160 years, similarly employed symbols to empha-
size his royal status. On this day, Wilhelm was crowned ldng in Königsberg, even 
though he had already b~en the Prussian ldng for more than two years. He had begun 
his reign on 26 October 1858, after his brother had fallen ill. In Prussia, a ldngdom since 
1701, coronation ceremonies had been uncommon until then. Instead, a ritual act of 
homage on the part of the estates was traditional. The lavish coronation of 1861, 
therefore, was an invented tradition introduced because the act of hmnage could no 
Iongerbe enforced in the constitutional state.2 
The Revolutions of 1789 and of 1848 fundamentally changed the way in which 
symbo!s of rule were created, maldng a return to the status qua ante impossible. In 
this sense, the Revolution of 1848-1849 did not end in failure. If unable to create a 
German nation state, the revolution nevertheless made lasting changes to the political 
and symbolic landscape. One of the new political symbols was the ritual of the 
constitutional oath. King Friedrich Wilhelm IV swore an oath to the Prussian 
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constitution in 1851, and his successor, Wilhelm I, did the same on 26 October 1858. 
Prematurely, but accurately, the liberal Gottfried Rudolf Campenhausen commented 
on this event of 1851: 'The bird is in the cage, and that is all that matters.'3 
13.1 LINES OF CONFLICT AND 
MODELS OF CONSENSUS 
·················································································································· 
The notion that rule requires identity, and that identity has to be based on unity and 
consensus, derives from assumptions of the liberal historiography of the nineteenth 
century. Symbols and liturgies, on the other hand, represented actions, differences, 
tasks, and institutions. The symbolic dispositive always implies more than one protag-
onist, with the monarch playing one role among others. Coronations, acts of homage, 
healing rituals, and the monarchic rule were all focused on the ldng as the main 
character of a drama. He represented a point at which antagonistic forces intersected, 
and his power symbolically derived from this convergence. 
Worldng in the liberal tradition, historians, however, have often understood drama 
and conflict as symptoms of disintegration and division within the nation. The German 
'culture war' (Kulturkampj) between liberalism and Catholicism has usually been 
described as an example of this narrative of division, with the existence of political 
and religious differences, as in the case of Catholics, Social Democrats, and Jews, used 
to justify the political exclusion of these groups for the benefit of unity. As is weil 
known, Heinrich von Treitschke, for most ofhis life aNational Liberal, took the view in 
November 1879 that Jews could only be German if they abstained from their 'Jewish-
ness,' an opinion shared by most of the liberal bourgeoisie.4 Those who were not in line 
with the National Liberalnarrative ofhomogenization, or who obstructed this process, 
were denigrated as the 'enemies of the Reich.' The liberals set their hopes in a rational 
social order without conflict.5 They also assumed that the nation state, in its ideal form, 
could only be accomplished when groups assimilated to the canon ofliberal values and 
liberal ideas of progress. Assimilation became the only viable means of conflict reso-
lution, with the result that in Imperial Germany, pluralism existed despite, rather than 
because of liberal politics.6 
Between 1850 and 1878, industrialization and nation building were the principal forces 
generating conflict. Both played a crucial role in politics and society. But in the following 
chapter, the foundation and formation of the German nation state will be the main 
focus. The process leading to this state was highly complex, and involved the formation 
of a political center in contrast to other economic, cultural, and regional centers.7 In a 
strict sense, this conflict was premised on a periphery which, in reality and ex ante, did 
not exist. Instead, there were several centers competing with each other for the oppor-
tunity to shape politics. Why, then, did a system with several political centers, which was 
incompatible with the liberal idea of a nation state and went along with the constant 
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threat of secessionism, evolve into a federalist system which was in line with a nation 
state and tolerated a Prussian dominated political center? This one averarehing question 
implies further questions. When and why did contemporaries deal with conflicts within 
a Germannation state instead of against a nation state? Could Austria have been part of 
this nation state? Which role could Prussia play in the process of nation building? How 
could Prussia, which was already a great power in economic and military terms, become 
part of Germany? And what were the possibilities of democracy and parliamentarianism 
in a nation state that included the militarypower of Prussia? 
The second conflict over nation building, which was linked to the first one, was the 
antagonism between the confessional majority and minority: in Germany, this conflict 
centered on the tension between Catholicism and a Protestant inflected liberalism. 8 
This conflict was ideologically charged, but it also had a regional character with 
Catholicism in the Rhineland and in Bavaria, for instance, also pursuing local interests. 
However, there were 'culture wars' in other European nation states too. Sometimes 
these were between Catholics and Protestants, and sometimes between secular liberals 
and Catholics.9 Why, and in which way, did German Catholics integrate themselves 
into a nation state which they had not wanted-particularly one in which the suprem-
acy of Catholic Austria was excluded? How did they benefit from integration? What 
institutional results did the 'culture war' have? 
Both conflicts had in common that liberals in Germany and elsewhere shared the 
basic logic of assimilation driven by a narrative of progress. 10 This particular narrative 
considered the Catholic Church as a cultural brake, and the Center Party as a political 
obstacle, to progress. Neither conflict was decided by an outright defeat or by a clear 
victory. On the contrary, these conflicts were contained and processed between 1850 and 
1878 by institutions such as the monarchical federal state, the Center Party and parlia-
mentary legislation, as weil as by federalism and the principle of mutual advantage. The 
liberal era between 1867 and 1878 was the 'critical juncture' (Gerhard Lehmbruch) of 
institution building in Germany. During this period, contemporaries developed proced-
ures of conflict resolution that involved the abstraction, transformation, and integration 
of conflicts. These procedures proved groundbrealdng for the future.I 1 
13.2 DRAMATIS PERSONAE: NATION BUILDING 
AND ITS ACTORS 1850-1878 
·················································································································· 
Although the Revolution of 1848-1849 failed to achieve its primary objective-the 
fotmdation of the German nation state-it still had a lasting impact on politics and 
society. If the reaction was successful in military terms, it did not achieve cultural 
hegemony. Put simply: the counter-revolution was victorious; the political restoration, 
however, was not. This can be demonstrated in three areas.I2 
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a) For one, the experience of coming so close to a German nation state in 1848-1849 
was not forgotten afterwards. As the German philosopher Immanuel Kant noted 
about the Revolution of 1789, a historical phenomenon of this magnitude would 
always be remembered.l3 The Assembly in the Faulskirehe had proved that it was 
possible to reach a parliamentary consensus on the structure of a nation state, and 
that the Lesser German Solution (Kleindeutsche Lösung) had a political and parlia-
mentary basis. If it failed due to the veto of the Prussian monarchy, the national 
dynamic of the Faulskirehe nevertheless had consequences far beyond the revolu-
tion. As the German Confederation urgently required reform from within, the 
debate about political possibilities began in the 185os, and, starting in autumn 
1858, began to focus on replacing the Confederation with a nation state.l4 What 
this state would look like, and what role Prussia would play in it, remained unclear, 
however. More evident was that Metternich's construction of the German Confed-
eration as an institution designed to prevent both democratic, and constitutional 
development, no longer seemed a viable option. In view of bourgeois demands for 
political participation, it also no longer seemed possible to base the state solely on 
the prestige of the monarchy. 
b) The second long-lasting changewas that in the course of the Revolution of 1848, 
Prussia evolved into and remained a constitutional state-unlike Austria. On 5 
December 1848, the Prussian king imposed a constitution that, with several mod-
ifications, remained in force until 1918. In Austria, meanwhile, Emperor Pranz 
Joseph abrogated the forced March Constitution of 1849 with the Sylvester Patent 
in 1851. Austria and Mecldenburg were now the only states within the German 
Confederation without a constitution. Mecklenburg went so far as to re-install the 
political order of the estates ( altständische Ordnung) of 1755. Generally, however it 
became clear that monarchs and rulers no longer had absolute power, but instead 
had to find new roles in order to communicate their status to civil society. Many 
appealed to the common good to create loyalty, others to 'filial devotion' towards 
the king. King Ernst August of Hanover, for example, portrayed hirnself as a father 
always concerned about the wellbeing ofhis Landeskinder (subjects), implying that 
only he knew exactly what was good for his immature children. Advocates for a 
constitution insisted, however, that the common good had to consist of respect for 
the people and their opinions, and that it required broad political participation. 
Unlike Ernst August in Hanover, the King of Württemberg, Karl T, represented a 
modern understanding ofhis role, inaugurating railway lines and seeing hirnself as 
the protector of the constitution.l5 In those states where monarchs opposed mod-
ernism and social and political participation, few people missed their rulers after 
they were deposed by Prussia in 1866. 
c) Thirdly and finally, in the course of the Revolution of 1848, the participants learned to 
think in terms of what, starting in 1853, would be called 'Realpolitik.' Liberals 
contrasted this 'Realpolitik' to a politics of idealism supposedly endemic to the 
revolutionaries of 1848. In his eponymous tract, Ludwig Rochau did not advocate 
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anti-revolutionary policies, but a specific form of dealing with the political experi-
ences of the revolution. 16 According to this view, 'Realpolitik' implied an acceptance 
of Prussia' s status and national relevance. Prussia was trying to get out of the German 
Confederation and its unwieldy regulations in order to expand its status as a great 
power. During the 185os, the Prussian envoy in Frankfurt, Otto von Bismarck, 
became aware that nationalism could be made useful for that political purpose. 
Bismarck's political view was, in fact, not diametrically opposed to the opinions of 
the liberal German National Association (Deutscher Nationalverein), an organiza-
tion for those who championed the Lesser German Solution. Crucially, both the 
Prussian government and the liberal national movement agreed on the exclusion of 
Austria from the nation-building plansP 
The Liberals, as the heirs of the revolution, perceived themselves as a national consti-
tutional movement. They intended to constitutionally limit, and even reduce, monar-
chical power. Constitutionalism expressed the bourgeois demand for political 
participation; it also differentiated liberalism from left-wing republican and democratic 
ideas while distancing liberals from the forces of political reaction. 
Before 1848, the constitutional celebrations in South Germany had symbolically 
confirmed these ideas. After 1848, however, they became less important, and the nation 
took over the function of curtailing monarchic power-as became apparent, for 
instance, on the occasion of the Schiller festivals in1859, which were lavishly celebrat-
ed. Schiller's dramas, especially 'The Robbers' and 'Don Carlos,' represented an 
emancipatory impulse, opposed to feudal society, and critical of autarchic rulers. 
The same characteristics also made him a national hero of the socialist workers' 
movement.l8 The large number of liberal voluntary associations represented this 
new national emphasis. Turning the cities into crucial platforms for liberal ideas, 
these associations included the choral and gymnastic societies, physical and geograph-
ical associations, natural scientific societies, bourgeois museum associations, and the 
freemasons.l 9 Around 1850, there were 50 different associations in Frankfurt am Main 
alone, engaging, even before the revolution, 2500-3000 members, or about half of the 
citizenry.20 The same happened in the other large cities oftheGerman Confederation. 
As voluntary associations became a structural element of civic society, they spread 
bourgeois and secular values, inculcating the principles of self organization, volunteer-
ism, and substantial internal equality. 
In these years, liberalism's center of gravity was in the cities, worldng, in Frankfurt and 
elsewhere, on local issues such as tax and trade legislation. Due to the census suffrage 
(votes weighted according to the amount of taxes paid), liberals had an advantage in the 
city councils, as was the case, for instance, in Cologne or Munich. 21 Liberal mayors, such 
as Johannes von Miquel (Osnabrück: 1865-1870; 1876-1880; Frankfurt am Main: 188o-
189o ), represented communalliberalism and to some extent liberalism itself. It was in the 
cities that liberals put into practice what they had in mind for the whole nation. 22 It was 
in Germany' s urban centers that liberal teachers steadfastly resisted being patronized by 
clerical supervision, and that Journalists opposed censorship. 
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In the two decades after the revolution, the liberals widened their organizational and 
media basis, as well as their level of support. In the Rhineland, liberals addressed their 
economic demands to the chambers of commerce, which in 1861 joined tagether to 
formtheGerman Association of the Chambers of Commerce (Deutscher Handelstag).z3 
As early as 1858, the Congress of German Economists (Kongress deutscher Volkswirte) 
came into existence and in 1862 the German Congress of Parliamentarians was formed 
(Deutscher Abgeordnetentag).24 Illustrated magazines, such as the Leipzig-based 'Garten-
laube,' brought liberal values of society and family into the mainstream.25 Gustav Freitag' s 
best-selling novel, 'Soll und Haben' ('Debit and Credit'), published in 1855, represented and 
idealized, especially in the main character of Anton Wohlfahrt, a liberal model in the 
spheres of family, business, and public life. In terms of political organization and presence 
in the public sphere, the liberals were ahead of all other political groups and most notably 
the conservatives. They began to lose their lead, circa 1863, mainly because of the declining 
culture of liberal voluntary associations among the lower classes.26 
Widening the liberal public sphere also altered the shape of liberalism. It was the 
revolution itself that caused this change. During the second revolutionary wave in the 
summer of 1848, many liberals had to face a 'social revolution' supported by workers 
and the lower classes. At this point, the solidarity among the opponents of absolutism, 
and the unity of the liberal movement, came to an end, and the idealized concept of a 
'civic society without classes,' as the German historian Lothar Gall has put it, per-
ished.27 After 1848, liberalism remained anational constitutional movement, but lost its 
egalitarian character. In political terms, it no Ionger advocated a Greater German 
Solution, even if the idea of a Greater German 'federative nation,' and the sense of 
cultural affiliation, remained. German Austrians, however, played little or no role in the 
economic, social, and cultural networks of the nation. The national movements of 
singers and gymnasts were almost exclusively located outside of Austria. And the 
Reform Association (Reformverein), which advocated a Greater German Solution, 
lost considerable influence to the German National Association (Deutscher National-
verein), which called for a small German Solution.28 
By championing the Lesser German Solution, the liberal constitutional movement 
turned into a political party. In 1861, the conflict between liberals and the Prussian 
monarchy came to a head, and culminated in the foundation of the Prussian Progres-
sive Party. Joining left-wing liberals and moderate democrats, it became the principal 
protagonist on the side of the liberals in the conflict with the Prussian king about the 
character of the Prussian constitution. They were also politically close to the Progres-
sive Parties in South Germany, founded a few years earlier. 
Regional differences among liberals soon became apparent. Although allliberals in 
north and south, east and west, fought to strengthen parliament and the constitution, 
the conflict was more intense in Prussia than in the South of Germany, where constitu-
tional structures had already been established in Napoleonic times, and where mon-
archs cooperated with parliaments. Political procedures, which had been practiced for a 
long time in Bavaria, Württemberg, and Baden, still had tobe fought for in Prussia. 
·-·., 
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Who were these liberals? The traditional differentiation between Bildungsliberalis-
mus (the liberalism of the educated dasses) and Wirtschaftsliberalismus (economic 
liberalism) marks important social actors within liberalism, but blurs several other 
differences: the difference between old and new Mittelstand (bourgeoisie), the differ-
ence between Catholics and Protestants, and the difference between northern and 
southern Germany. In Baden, for instance, a certain liberal esprit de corps, originating 
from their years as students tagether in Freiburg and Heidelberg, prevailed among 
higher civil servants. Not every bourgeois was liberal, and not every liberal was 
bourgeois. Some Catholics kept their distance from liberalism; others were oriented 
to it. 29 First and foremost, the social strata underneath the middle dass, predominantly 
workers, were engaged in liberal organizations. Worlcers were organized in left-wing 
liberal associations and only parted with bourgeois democracy in the 186os or 187os-
the precise timing is controversial,3° Their separation from bourgeois left-wing liberal-
ism was a result of dass formation and, at the same time, a driving aspect of this 
process.31 Until the 187os, the early workers' movement perceived itself as a radical 
democratic people' s movement in the tradition of the March Revolution of1848. 
Unlilce liberalism, the Catholic Church, Catholicism and particularly the Catholic laity, 
emerged strengtherred from 1848. The revolution had abolished the paternalism of the 
state church and state representatives came to see the Catholic Church as an ally in fighting 
the revolution. The Trier pilgrimage of 1844, a mass pilgrimage to the Searnless Robe of 
Christ housed in the Cathedral of Trier, had already foreshadowed this development. 
Social protestwas articulated not as politics, but as piety. The dosing of ranks did not last 
long, however, because the Catholic bishops pushed through a strict anti-modernism 
among the pious. Pius IX turned this anti-modernism into a religious and political 
doctrine of faith, first with the dogma of the 'Immaculate Conception,' annunciated in 
1854, then, more decisively still, with the dogma ofPapal infallibility in 1870, promulgated 
on the eve of the Franco-Prussian war. 
After 1848 laymen played a key role in Catholic voluntary associations and in 
political representation. Liberals were especially sensitive to the fact that lower dass 
Catholics, unlike the Catholics of the Bildungsbürgertum, affered no resistance to the 
two waves of ultramontane dogmatism of 1854 and 1870. The Immaculate Conception 
of the Virgin Mary and the infallibility of the Pope opposed everything the liberals 
stood for, induding the heritage of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution, and 
the privileged position of scientific social knowledge. In sociological terms, it affered 
the benefit of drawing a sharp line between the in-group and the out-group, creating 
distinct affiliations in tim es of rapid change. 
Patterns of collective interpretations and everyday culture grew further and further 
apart. Ultramontane Catholics reshaped popular piety. Marian devotions and the Cult 
of the Sacred Heart affered an attractive language of religious imagery, particularly for 
the lower dasses. Many churches of the Sacred Heart were built, communities estab-
lished, and brotherhoods founded. The cult of the Sacred Heart was defensive, sorrow-
ful, and anti-modern.32 This defensiveness was expressed through the activities of its 
prayer brotherhoods, and several formal and informal spiritual association; it also 
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revealed the significant extent to which rural Catholics, and those from the lower and 
middle classes in the cities of the Rhineland, felt threatened by Prussia's aggressive 
religious policies. In addition, liberals and Catholics often stood in direct social cantrast 
to one another. In the Saarland, the Rhineland, andin Westphalia, Protestant employ-
ers often employed Catholic workers, with the result that social protest and confessional 
conflict often reinforced each other. The Bisbop of Mainz, Wilhelm Emanuel Freiherr 
von Ketteler, was the informalleader of the German Catholics, and represented the link 
between ultramontanism and social-political claims.33 For bishops lil<:e Ketteler, but 
also for the rurallower classes, devotion to Rome was compelling in social terms. 
Conflicts between liberals and ultramontane Catholics had a long tradition. On the 
political level, these conflicts concerned the relationship between church and state, 
including mixed marriages, freedom of religion, and religious education. In 1837, the 
struggle over mixed marriages culminated in the so-called Cologne affair, in which the 
Archbishop of Cologne, Clemens August von Droste-Vischering, was arrested and held 
in special confinement in Minden. In 1848, several Catholic members of the National 
Assembly refused to introduce freedom of religion as a constitutional right, as the 
liberals demanded. Ultramontane Catholics saw this, and the entire concept of a liberal 
constitutional state, as an affront to their faith, to the monarchy, and to divine right, if 
not in fact the divine order itself. They understood sovereignty in theological terms as 
divine sovereignty, not politically as the people's sovereignty. The same held true for the 
issue of elementary and religious education, which became a permanent political topic 
after 1848.34 The ultramontane Catholic Edmund Jörg from Allgäu, the Hanover-based 
minister Ludwig Windthorst, and the jurist Hermann von Mallinckrodt became promi-
nent exponents of this view. They formulated a Catholic critique of the state in which the 
state was not perceived as the definitive measure of the political order, but as an entity 
derived from the concepts of family and community. In their approach, the family came 
first, the community second, and the state last, and only in reference to those issues that 
could not be dealt with in the family or the community. When Edmund Jörg continually 
criticized the interventionist state, and other Catholics defended the rights of the Church 
against the state, this ran contrary to the advocates of a liberal nation state guaranteeing 
freedom of religion and championing the state as a modernizer. On the question of the 
relationship between state and church, on religious policy, and on political theory, 
liberals and ultramontane Catholics were diametrically opposed. In the Syllabus Er-
rorum o( 1864, Pope Pius IX sharpened these pointed differences by anathematizing 
liberalism. At the end of a long list of errors, Pius IX condemned as error nurober So the 
sentence: 'The Roman Pontiff can, and ought to, reconcile himself, and come to terms 
with progress, liberalism and modern civilization.'35 
This not only concerned religion and the church, but also the order of society and 
the nation state. According to Edmund Jörg and Pranz Joseph Ritter von Buß from 
Baden, a national society was only possible as a Christian-or more precisely-a 
Catholic society. But even the representatives of this political orientation understood 
that religion no Ionger stood at the center of the political order, and that its importance 
had subsided. Consequently, the Katholikentage (a festival-like gathering organized by 
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and for Catholic laity and their associations) of 1848 and 1849 declared Germany itself a 
mission country. The task of the Bonifatius Association, founded in 1849, was therefore 
an inner mission.36 By worshipping Bonifatius and choosing the city of Fulda, where 
the English missionary's grave was located, as the venue for the Catholic Bishops' 
Conference, German ultramontane Catholics underlined their ties to Rome. To them, 
Germany had only come into existence with the help of Rome, or more precisely with 
the help of the missionary Winfrit-Bonifatius, who was sent by Rome to bring 
Christian culture to the territory of Germania. For liberals the opposite was true: 
Germany had come into being in the course of the fight against Rome, and could be 
traced back to the struggle between Hermann of the Cherusci and the Romans. Luther' s 
brealc with Rome and the concept of celibacy, as well as the foundation of the 
Protestant vicarage as a prototype of the bourgeois family, stood in the tradition of 
this anti-Roman interpretation of history.37 The worshipping of Bonifatius was a 
political statement diametrically opposed to the cults of Hermann and Luther. 
In political terms, this antagonism distilled into two parties, liberal and Catholic. In the 
beginning, there was the highly politicized Pius Associations of 1848, which demanded , 
constitutionally protected rights for the Catholic Church. Catholic members of the . 
Prussian Diet constituted the core of a new Catholic party and in 1852 they formed 
a parliamentary group, which from 1858 on called themselves the 'Center Faction' 
(Zentrumsfraktion). Between 1864 and 1866, araund 100 Catholic politicians gathered at 
nine conferences in Soest in order to found a partywith a clear political program. They did 
so in response to the foundation of the liberal National Association and the Progressive 
Party. The Soest program of 1870 formulated the slogan: 'For truth, justice and freedom,' 
and on this basis, in 1871, the Center Party was founded. Its aim was to defend the rights of 
the Church, and primarily of confessional schools, against the modern state. It advocated a 
federalist state structure and sought dass harmony on the basis of Catholic social teaching. 
This liberal-Catholic conflict did not occur in Germany alone. In all European 
countries, where the process of nation building or reconstruction had started, 'culture 
wars' emerged between Protestant or lay liberals on the one hand, and ultramontane 
Catholics on the other.38 These 'culture wars' were especially fierce in the southern 
European countdes with a nominal Catholic majority, where a minority of laieist 
liberals sought conflict with a majority society defined by its Catholicism. In Germany, 
this conflict had an ideological, a political, and a social dimension. 
13.3 THE CLIMAX: CULMINATION 
AND PERIPETEIA 
·················································································································· 
When Wilhem I assumed the regency in October 1858, the basic parameters of the 
'national question' had changed, becoming, in the so-called 'New Era,' the central focus 
of politics. The political dynamic in the German Confederation was given a new 
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direction due to the Italian War of 1859 between France and Austria. A war involving 
Austria, as head of the German Confederation, demanded that everyone take a stance. 
With the exception of a few democrats, and Otto von Bismarck, the matter was clear: the 
Italian war was also about Germany. In the south of Germany, religious solidarity with 
Catholic Austria was also a factor. The Italian War thus unified the liberal national 
movement and closed the gap between advocates ofthe small and large German Solutions. 
Internal conflict followed the Italian War. Prussian Liberals and the government 
fought from 186o onward for about six years in an agonizing, but decisive constitu-
tional conflict. Progressive liberals in Prussia, such as Viktor von Unruh, Benedikt 
W aldeck, and Wilhelm Löwe, challenged the throne in an open conflict in a political 
field, which the king considered his own preserve: namely, the Prussian military 
constitution. Since the Napoleonic Wars and the army reform of 1814, the Prussian 
army had not grown in size; now it was Wilhelm' s desire to adapt its size to a 
Prussian population that had grown from 11 to 18 million people. Three measures 
were to serve this purpose: increasing the annual conscription of recruits from 40,ooo 
to 63,000, raising the peacetime size of the army from 15o,ooo to 21o,ooo, and 
prolonging military service from two to three years. Furthermore, the civil militias 
(Landwehren), which originated from the liberal idea of a citizen-soldier, were tobe 
integrated into the royal army. The liberal majority in the Prussian Diet disagreed 
vehemently with all three proposals, in particular the extension of military service to 
three years, and the integration of the Landwehr into the royal army.39 Liberals were, 
however, willing to support some military reform. Those who favored the Lesser 
German Solution set their hopes on the military strength of Prussia and its 'German 
mission,' although they demanded a civil militia and a military service of two years. 
This conflict became irresolvable because the military reform advocated by King 
Wilhelm. and the War Minister, Albrecht von Roon, required large amounts of 
money '_which had to be approved by the Prussian Diet, where the liberals held a 
majority. The issue of the army reform, therefore, was not only a question of state 
organization, where the monarch held the prerogative, but also a question of state 
fiminces, where the budgetary powers of parliament applied. Liberals found common 
ground, advancing the motto: 'Parliamentary army or the King's army.' Like the 
dogma of papal infallibility in 1870, the constitutional conflict provided both political 
camps with simple phrases to sharply distinguish each other.40 This conflict was 
expressed in parliamentary speeches, pamphlets, and in the political press, albeit 
largely without the participation of ordinary people. Parliament and government 
were in open, systemic conflict. 
Previous strategies of conflict resolution no langer worked in this conflict. 
A monarchic counter revolution would be against public opinion and was bound to 
lead to a military dictatorship that was incalculable even for the monarchy. However, 
Prussian constitutionalism also faced a road block, because the two conflicting 
constitutional principles could not be aligned. The crisis endangered the entire 
system. The langer the conflict continued, the slimmer the chance of resolving it. 
In May 1862, the liberal Diet members Karl Twesten and Heinrich Sybel found a 
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compromise with the War Minister, Albrecht von Roon. The liberals were willing to 
agree to the overall budget if the length of military service was not extended. The 
king, well aware of the consequences, refused to compromise, and his intransigence 
provoked the Diet to reject the entire budget. Discredited by his own government, 
Wilhelm was ready to abdicate in favor of his son, Crown Prince Friedrich, who was 
regarded as more liberal. 
In the end, however, it was not Crown Prince Friedrich, but Otto von Bismarck, who 
defined the monarchical response to the liberal challenge. On 22 September 1862, 
Bismarck was appointed Minister President of Prussia. If he derived his fame as the 
faunder of the German Empire, he was nevertheless more a divisive figure than a 
unifying one.41 Born in the year of the congress of Vienna, he stood at the center ot 
every conflict in his tenure as Prussian Minister President and German Chancellor. H~: 
started as a diehard anti-liberal in the Prussian constitutional conflict, and then 
alienated the Prussian conservatives when integrating Prussia in the new Reich. After 
1871, he antagonized the Catholics in the 'Kulturkampf,' the Socialists in the anti-
Socialist legislation of 1878, and finally the liberals in 1879, when he shifted from free 
trade to tariffs. He stood at the center of multiple political conflicts as well as conflict 
resolutions. He became a mythical figure, a trickster, who, following the ethnologist 
Claude-Levi Strauss, represented at the sametime Contradietory aspects of old and the 
new, legitimizing change and making it tolerable.42 
Starting in 1862 he promised to defend monarchical prerogatives at any co~t; In. the 
Prussian Diet he immediately attacked the liberals: 'The great questions of the tirri~ will 
not be decided by speeches and majority decisions-that was the great mistake oh848 
and 1849-but by iron and blood.'43 Bismarck thereby portrayed as contradictory 
constitutional parliamentary democracy on the one side, and economic growth and 
military success on the other. 
Supportcrs of the compromise in both campslost ground. The constitutional conflict 
escalated into an institutional crisis. Georg Meyer and Gerhard Anschütz later famous-
ly commented on the situation: 'Here public law reaches its limit. The question ofhow 
to proceed if no budget law exists is not a legal issue.'44 
13.4 THE LIBERAL ERA AS CRITICAL JUNCTURE OF 
INSTITUTION BUILDING, 1867-1878 
·················································································································· 
The Prussian wars against Denmark, Austria, and France transformed the constitu-
tional conflict. These wars-against Denmark over Schleswig and Holstein in 1864, 
then against Austria over federal reform in 1866, and finally against France in 1870-
were national wars of unification only from the perspective of 1871.45 From the 
viewpoint of 1850, they could just as well have been called 'national wars of exclusion,' 
because they ultimately sealed the exclusion of Austria from Germany. 
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The foundation of the German nation state took place through and amidst war. This 
was not only true for Germany, but was common to the foundation of most European 
nation states: France in 1792, Belgium in 1830, and Italy in 1859, with the peaceful 
separation of Norway and Sweden in 1905 an exception. The connection between war 
and the foundation of the nation state is based on collective mobilization through 
fighting an external enemy. The war of 1848, which the Paulsldrche fought against 
Denmark over Schleswig and Holstein, was already characterized by inner national 
participation and outward aggression.'46 In Germany, external wars also served an 
internal purpose: the victory over Catholic Austria, and to an even greater extent the 
victory against France, was, for example, stagedas a victory of Protestant Germany over 
Catholicism itself and proved the invincibility of Prussia and its military monarchy. 
Prussia's military success over Denmark at the battle ofDybbol (Düppeler Schanzen) 
on 18 April1864, and, even more so, the victory over the Austrian troops at Königgrätz 
on 3 July 1866, seemed to legitimize Bismarck's policy of 1862 retrospectively. This was, 
at least, the view of the predominant part of the national movement, which supported 
the Lesser German Solution. When he switched sides, Karl Twesten, one of the 
founders of the Progressive Party and critics of Bismarck and authoritarian rule, was 
typical of many liberals. He stated that 'an inner conflict in a singleGerman state and a 
conflict between different German states must be set aside, when it comes to the 
integrity of the German fatherland.' 47 In other words: the successful wars had opened 
a new chapter in the relations between the liberals and Bismarck In autumn 1866, 
· Hermann Baumgarten published his self-criticism ofliberalism, in which he went so far 
as to advocate co-operation with Bismarck.4B 
As a result of the Austro-Prussian War, the world of the German states changed 
completely. Austria was excluded from the decision-maldng process regarding the 
national question. The Kingdom of Hanover, the Eieetarate of Hessen Kassel, the 
Duchy of Nassau, and the Imperial city of Frankfurt, were annexed by Prussia as it 
connected its Western territories with those in the Bast. Prussia was seemingly on the 
ascendant, even in financial terms, because the economic boom filled the government's 
pockets with increasing tax revenues. Baumgarten concluded his self-criticism that the 
bourgeoisie was meant for work and not for rule. For him, the political consequence of 
the constitutional conflict was shared liberal bourgeois and aristocratic monarchic rule. 
This separation of spheres originated from the tradition of compromise and agreement 
which had been characteristic for liberals in the Vormärz period. 
The liberal era between 1867 and 1878 saw new institutions that have been characteristic 
ofGermany's political systemever since.49 The new institutions regulated, contained, and 
transformed national and confessional conflicts. The first institutional step to pacify the 
Prussian constitutional conflict was the Indemnity Bill of 26 September 1866. The govern-
ment admitted having acted illegally in governing without an a:pproved budget since 1862 
and was, in return, exempted from punishment; that is to say, it received indemnity. The 
Indemnity Bill soothed the conflict because a vast majority of 235 members of the Prussian 
parliament against 75 granted indemnity to the government for its breach of the constitu-
tion. In so doing, they legitimized the government's action retrospectively.50 
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Many historians used to consider the Indemnity Bill and the subsequent split of 
liberalism in 1866 to have been the defeat or the collapse of German liberalism. To 
them, German liberals were tempted to abandon their liberal principles and succumb 
to the government in power because they admired Bismarck's political success. In the 
long-term, this accommodation to power allegedly weakened democratic ideals among 
Germany's bourgeoisie and subsequently prepared the way for 1933.51 According to this 
view, the cooperation between NationalLiberalsand Bismarck meant that the former 
accepted a system that was only partially parliamentary. But there was another side to it 
as well. The Indemnity Bill also opened up new possibilities for the liberals, giving them 
cause to assume that theywould be in a position to change circumstances in Prussia. To 
see only authoritarian solutions and their consequences for the twentieth century does 
not take into consideration that there were also other institutions of conflict resolution 
between 1867 and 1871-ones that did not lead to 1933, most importantly those 
involving democratic suffrage and federalism. These also created new conflicts, 
which were then transferred to the Reich, but compatible with national co-existence. 
Four different developments contained, reworked, and transformed both conflicts: 
democratic suffrage, which introduced party competition and parliamentary negotia-
tion strategies; federalism, which reorganized the relationship between the individual 
states and the nation state; a strong monarchy, which could solve conflicts and make 
decisions from above; and the principles of parity and proportionality. The conflicts of 
the Revolution of 1848 and of the 185os were not resolved, as the national enthusiasts 
perceived them to have been in 1871, but were regulated and contained according to 
different patterns of action. These patterns were, in fact, contradictory, but could also 
converge. Some of them, such as the concept of federalism, were old, others, such as 
democratic suffrage, were new and untested. 
13.4.1 Democratic suffrage, Parliamentarianism and party 
competition in the federal state 
On 12 February 1867, democratic elections were held for the first time in the North 
German Confederation. Every North German man older than 25 years who did not 
receive any public assistance was entitled to vote for the constituent Reichstag of the 
North German Confederation.52 There was no electoral boycott as suggested by the 
Progressive Party, which bad denied Bismarck indemnity for bis constitutional breach. 
The turnout in Prussia was, with an average of 65 per cent, substantially higher than in 
the Diet elections, which were held under the undemocratic three-class voting system. 
On 25 September 1867, only 1.45 million people in the older Prussian provinces bad 
voted for the Diet. On 12 February 1866, meanwhile, 2.57 million voters showed up for 
the Reichstag elections. Most of them were first time voters. It was no langer the 
electoral colleges that effectively decided the result, as was the case in the Prussian 
elections, but the individual voter. The voters themselves bad their say in the national 
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elections, and the National Liberals won the elections with So mandates, showing 
particularly strong in the new Prussian territories of Hanover, Kassel, and Nassau. 
In that same year electoral reform was also high on the agenda of the House of 
Commons in London. The Second Reform Act primarily extended suffrage to the 
urban regionsandwas perceived as a revolutionary 'leap in the dark' (Lord Derby).53 
This was even truer in the case of Germany's elections where democratic and parlia-
mentary traditions were much less developed. German democratic suffrage was not the 
result of pressure by socialists and democrats, but by revolution from above. Bismarck 
had several motives for advocating the suffrage once championed by the Paulskirche. It 
ultimately excluded Austria from the new national order, because this type of suffrage 
could not be applied in multi-national Austria. In terms of foreign affairs, its demo-
cratic appeal to the nation legitimized Prussian expansion to the other European great 
powers-first and foremost Great Britain. More importantly, the democratic suffrage, 
accepted only hesitantly by the National Liberals, curtailed the influence of the liberal 
bourgeoisie and its electoral colleges, the 'distilled bourgeoisie' (Bismarck). From 
Bismarck's point of view, it ensured that a liberal parliamentary majority, as had 
occurred in Prussia, would not occur in the Reich. Liberals had benefited from 
the census system in the Prussian suffrage. In the Reich, their influence was balanced 
by the urban and rural lower classes. Bismarck, on the other hand, relied on the 
conservative and royal mindset of the rural population. Liberals always performed 
worse in the Reichstag elections than in the Prussian elections. However, the winners in 
the long run were not the conservatives, but the Catholic Center Party and the Socia:l 
Democrats. 
· Even contemporaries perceived Bismarck's strategy as a means of rule inspired by 
Bonapartism. It was designed to weaken liberal leaders in parliament, and even to 
weaken parliament as an institution.54 Friedrich Engels equated the foundation of the 
North German Confederation with Louis Bonaparte's open ta:l<e-over of power in 1851 
and noticed the temptation of the Bonapartist form of rule: 'The period of revolutions 
from below was concluded for the time being; it followed a period of revolutions from 
above .... '55 Napoleon III demonstrated that a monarchic state could exist with, andin 
spite of, a democratic voting system, and that an authoritarian state government did 
not contradict the principle of political representation. However, the enthusiasm of the 
Prussian state ministry for Bonapartism soon flagged. In Prussia, there were candidates 
from the ranks of the ministry backed by the government. In East Elbia, the typical 
ministerial candidate was a conservative landowner, in W estphalia and in the Rhine-
land he was a conservative civil servant. This patternwas still apparent in the elections 
of 1867, but it could not prevail against the mobilizing effect of party machines and 
their candidates in the long run. Bismarck took over the democratic voting system, but 
he was hardly able to appropriate it in a Bonapartist way, because-as he put it-
'Germans cannot be governed in the same manner as the French.'56 
Seen from a theoretical perspective, the democratic voting system integrated con-
flicts into parties. Political opponents became parties, which competed for as large a 
share of the national vote as possible, and no Ionger attempted to eliminate each other. 
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This was possible because democratic suffrage legitimized the opposition. No ultimate 
decision was taken by the democratic franchise. · Every three, or since 1888, every five 
years, voters decided on their political representation. The democratic franchise did not 
resolutely solve, but rather processed conflicts by periodic elections. Based on the fact 
that there was more than merely one opinion to every political issue, the democratic 
franchise engendered in the long run a pluralistic community, where majority and 
minority were constantly changing. 
Prussia's fierce opponents in the process of German nation building organized 
themselves into parties and stood as candidates. Competing interests and ideas, the 
elixir of democratic institutions, thereby had an integrative function in the nation 
state.S7 Only eight months after their defeat at the hands of Prussia, the Saxon patriots 
took part in the North German elections. In so doing, they accepted the North German 
Confederation as the basis for their political actions, even while they kept a jealous 
watch over the independence of Saxony. The royal Hanoverians, the Welfs, and the 
Bavarian patriots acted in the same way. They all accepted the Reich by taking part in 
the Reichstag elections. The democratic franchise and parties helped foster abstract 
identities that brought tagether people from different regions with similar interests. 
Conflicts between Bavarians and Prussians were not fought agairrst national institu-
tions, but within them. In the words of the historian Margaret Lavinia Anderson: 'As 
regional and national organizations took on more and more electoral functions, they 
contributed to a process of abstraction, in which the community was redefined into 
something trans-local: confession, dass, andin most cases party. It was with abstrac-
tions such as these that the voters eventually identified.'58 Voters recognized their myn 
interests in a national party system, which was not built along local or regionallines; 
Here lies a certain similarity between the foundation of the Reich in 1871, and the 
German unification in 1990, when the PDS, the successor of the communist SED, 
stood in the Bundestag elections and thereby pragmatically accepted the democratic 
character of the new order, which the party had steadfastly opposed until then. By 
contrast, in the Weimar Republic the KPD had refused to stand in the general elections 
in January 1919. 
Democratization could be interpreted either as political participation or as emanci-
pation from older authorities. Political participation gave legitimacy to the political 
order. Even conservative authors, such as the Saxon minister and law professor Carl 
Gerber, welcomed democratic institutions in order to foster the monarchy. What he 
and his like-minded colleagues had in mind was a rather new form of legitimacy 
indispensable for the monarchical order. Whereas authors like Gerber accepted forms 
of direct democracy, Bismarck rejected parliamentary government following the Eng-
lish example.59 Those who understood democracy as a way of political emancipation 
Were to be found on the political left. For Socialists, democracy made their strength 
public and visible. Even here on the political left, democracy was much more praised 
than the parliamentary dimension of politics. Whereas parliaments were seen as 
instruments of bourgeois domination, democracy always had the utopian flavor of a 
better world. Parliament did not control the German government. The democratic 
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extension of the fra11chise had not led to a political system with government standi11g 
against the opposition, but with government standi11g against parliament. 
In the long run, however, the Reichstag, even without the right to elect the Reich-
skanzler, became a key institution in the Reich and a central forum for conflict 
resolutio11 and the political articulation of interests.60 In 1873, 011 the initiative of the 
Liberal Eduard Lasker, legislative competence for the e11tire civil, crimi11al and proce-
dural law-that is, all questions of the rules of procedure and legal equality-were 
transmitted to the Reich and therefore to the Reichstag. Several committees of the 
Reichstag drafted the Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, BGB), which came into 
effect 011 1 January 1900 and had a lasting effect on German society. By 1878, the 
Reichstag had passed 179 bills, many of which extended the regulations of the North 
German Confederation to the Reich. Democratic suffrage, the Reichstag and its legisla-
tion shaped the population of the Reich into a political society. East Prussians, 
Swabians, Rhinelanders, and Silesians all voted under the same suffrage and were 
subjects of the same law. The Reichstag became a symbol of the political nation even 
in the view of the Reich population. This was shown by a broad media interest in and 
ntimerous complai11ts about any kind of electoral manipulatio11 or fraud. 61 
In. a very short period, the democratic voting system made an impact a11d supported 
a party system that was essentially similar in all regions. At the Reichstag electio11s in 
1871 there were only eight constituencies with a single candidate. All other co11stitu-
encies saw several candidates, even if it was often clear who would win the mandate. As 
a result, diversity of opinion prevailed on a broad basis. The unexpected pace of this 
development becomes clear, when we look to Great Britain, where approximately a 
quarter of all seats in the House of Commons went u11contested as late as 1910.62 
Democratic suffrage accelerated the development of the German party system whose 
roots dated back to the Revolution of 1848. The traditional binary party system, which 
functioned according to the pattern of 'order versus revolution,' made way for a four-
party system consisti11g of liberalism, conservatism, political Catholicism and social-
ism. These '-isms' usually stood for families of parties. There were several conservative 
parties-Reichs- und Freikonservative Partei (Reich and Free Conservative Party) a11d 
Konservative Partei (Conservative Party)-next to the two liberal parties (National 
Liberals and Progressive Party) and the socialists under the lead of AugustBebeland 
Wilhelm Liebknecht (from 1869 Sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei, Social Democratic 
Workers' Party; from 1875 Sozialistische Arbeiterpartei Deutschlands, Sodalist W orkers' 
Party of Germany). In winter 1870/71, the newly established Catholic Center Party 
nationalized Catholics from all parts of Germany in one Catholic party. In the same 
way the socialist party nationalized socialists from Berlin and Wuppertal in one party. 
The national party system created national political interests transverse to regional 
interests. It also transferred regional conflicts to the nationallevel. The thousands of 
local religious conflicts, for instance, between the Catholic clergy and liberals were 
transformed into a national conflict immediately after unification in 1872, when liberal 
legislation attacked the Catholic church. The local protagonists on both sides looked 
to the nationallevel for help and assistance. 
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In the first decade of the Empire, large voting biodes and groups of party supporters 
were formed. According to the findings of the Catholic electoral researcher Johannes 
Schauff, between 1874 and 1884, the Center Party succeeded in mobilizing almost the 
entire Catholic electorate, with eighty percent of all eligible Catholic voters casting their 
vote in favor of the Center Party.63 If these figures were in constant decline thereafter, 
the number of votes for the Center Party was even higher among devout Catholics. The 
'culture war' had enabled this development. It emotionally anchored the German party 
system in the minds of the Catholic electorate. The same was true for the socialists with 
regard to the Anti-Socialist laws after 1878. For the Catholics, the 'culture war', or 
Kulturkampf, left a deep-seated sense of threat among Catholics, which in turn created 
emotional cohesion, and enabled a network of voluntary associations and the creation 
of a political community of conviction. The Catholic social milieu, which shaped the 
German party Iandscape until1928 when it ultimately eroded, originated in the 186os 
and 187os.64 As in the socialist milieu, Catholic Germany depended on constantly 
recreating the original sense of threat. Catholic clerics, associations, media, and the 
Katholikentage continually restaged, and thus rendered contemporaneous this primor-
dial moment of threat. Sodalist party conventions and anniversaries worked the 
same way. 
The differences between liberals and conservatives gradually faded away after 1871. 
The political scientist Karl Rohe has even identified a joint 'national camp' arehing over 
both political parties. The parties' common electoral interest in the run-off system, 
which privileged party coalitions in the second ballot, had enabled this situation. Here, 
conservatives and liberalsoften cooperated.65 The national camp gained in importance 
when conservatives turned to tariff protection of rye and steel in 1879. Both parties also 
opposed the socialists after 1878. In terms of the main conflicts of nation building, this 
realignment between conservatives and liberals finally brought ~n end to the Prussian 
constitutional conflict, when both camps had fought a seemingly deadly war. In the 
188os, the national camp took over from the liberals as the informal governing party, 
becoming in the 189os the cornerstone of the Sammlungspolitik ( the polky of 
'gathering' all productive forces that sought to 'protect' the state against the Social 
Democrats) . 
. 13.4.2 Federalism and authoritarianism 
One of the most significant consequences of the Prussian constitutional conflict for 
Bismarck was to prevent a parliamentary regime on the nationallevel at any cost. He 
faced a liberal majority in the Prussian Diet for years and wanted to prevent that 
the Reich. This purposewas served by the Reich's federal construction, which was 
' to prevent a showdown as had occurred in Prussia between government and 
t. Unlike the North American model, as codified in the Federalist Papers, 
in Germany did not organize democracy within a territorial state. By 
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contrast, it organized the permanent acquiescence of the individual German states 
towards a national state and its institutions to which they had transferred important 
rights. Bismarck's political objective was to preserve and strengthen the Prussian 
monarchy, which in 1871 turned into an imperial monarchy. To him, this was most 
likely to be achieved through the federal structure of an everlasting federation of 25 
rulers and city governments-the so called members of the federation (Bundesglied-
er)-and not through democratic elections involving 41 million Germans. The Reich 
had legislative powers, the German states executive powers. This was the origin of the 
specific form of federalism in Germany: cooperative federalism. What was signed into 
law by the national state was set into practice by the states' administration-thereby 
underscoring the importance of the states. In practice, it meant that the entry of Sax:ony 
or Baden into the Reich did not involve a change of elites as it did in 1990 when Bast 
and West Germany were reunited. Instead, Saxon postmen turned into Reich postmen. 
In terms of officials, a surprisingly smallnumber of individuals represented the Reich 
in the Bismarck period.66 Instead, it was the familiar authorities of the states which 
executed Reich legislation. The impact of this fact on the social acceptance of the new 
national order cannot be emphasized enough. 
This was even more pronounced in the seemingly technical field of the imperial 
finances. The national constitution ensured that the Reich had its own revenues from 
tariffs and taxes, although they were rather limited until1879. In the imperial period, it 
was only in 1896 that the income of the central government covered its budgetary 
expenditures. In all other years the difference was paid for by the states (Matrikular-
beiträge), speciallevies from the states according to their population size, or by the Reich 
incurring debts. This had Iasting consequences for national integration. At least until 
1879, the tax officers in the single states virtually funded the Reich, or at least this was the 
impression most people had. It helped to make the wave of standardization, which swept 
through German society after 1867 and 1871, socially and politically bearable. Practically, 
it meant that the German parliament could not shut down the government by rejecting 
the budget, which Prussian liberals had tried to do in 1862. 
Constitutionally, the German Reich was governed by the Bundesrat. Next to the 
R~ichstag, the Bundesrat was the supreme body gathering German rulers and city 
governments. Unlilce the US Senate, which allows the same amount of votes to every 
state regardless of its size, the different states and cities had votes in the Bundesrat 
according to the size of their population. The exception was Prussia. It comprised about 
two-thirds of the Reich territory and approximately sixty per cent of the Reich 
population, but in order to ease the integration of the smaller states, Prussia held 
merely seventeen out of the entire fifty-eight votes. It therefore depended on the 
approval of other states-in most cases the kingdoms in South Germany-to get a 
majority. Prussian diplomats were usually quite successful in doing so. Strategically, the 
Prussian foreign ministerwas at the center of this diplomatic webthat planned national 
politics. It was from this position that Otto von Bismarck controlled the Bundesrat. 
The Bundesrat had a dual function. On the one hand, it took part inlegislation along 
with the Reichstag. On the other hand, the Reich government was headed by the federal 
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presidium, a position held by the Prussian king as German Emperor. His head of 
chancellery, the Reich chancellor, was responsible for the executive. At the chancellor's 
side were state secretaries instead of ministers responsible to the Reichstag. This specific 
structure prevented the Reichstag from criticizing or even attacking the Reich govern-
ment in public. As a monarchical federal state the Reich was not meant to be 
parliamentarized. At the same time, federalism and Bundesrat served as institutions 
to prevent democracy, because all important decisions-first and foremost all military 
matters-remained the domain of the executive government. This again was a result of 
the Prussian constitutional conflict. The federal structure of the Reich was deliberately 
geared against democratic principles, and this facilitated the integration of Bavaria, 
Württemberg, Saxony, and all other states into the Reich. Up to the present day, the 
ability of single state governments to take part in the decision-maldng process through 
the Bundesrat is still a formative principle of German politics.67 
However, the profound democratic costs of the political construction cannot conceal 
thc fact that federalism in the medium term had already solved the contradiction 
between the political center of the Reich and the member states. In Imperial Germany, 
the solution to the center-periphery conflict involved giving the member states a voice in 
nationallegislation. German states were not provinces, being objects oflegislation, but 
instead participants in the work of nationallegislation. One example, still of relevance 
today, is civil marriage. In 1875, the liberal Bavarian state government, which was in 
dispute with the Catholic patriotic majority of the Diet, addressed not only the Bundes-
rat, but also the Reichstag and achieved the nationwide introduction of obligatory civil 
marriage that would never have met with a majority in the Bavarian Diet.68 
Whereas, federalism encouraged the gradual transition from a constellation character-
ized by the exclusion of region and nation, to one marked by the inclusion of the two in the 
186os, one was either a Bavarian or a German, in 1890 one was a German because one was 
a Bavarian. The same mechanism had already become apparent in regard to localism and 
regionalism. A man from Nurernberg was initially a Franconian, then a Bavarian and 
finally a German. None of these characteristics was relativized by the others. Loyalties 
towards community, region, individual state and nation state did not end up in a zero-
sum game in which the increasing loyalty towards the nation state would simultaneously 
imply a declining loyalty towards the region or community. By assuming the position of 
assimilation, leading representatives of modernization theory and the process of nation 
building, such as Karl W. Deutsch, supposed that geographically extensive concepts of 
identity would supersede geographically narrower concepts. In reality, inclusion was 
based on federalism and on the preservation oflocal and regionalloyalties.69 
This was also caused by a growing communication and an increase in mobility 
among the Reich population. Railway companies, conceived within states and 
tightly controlled by governments until 1920, extended their territorial network. 
The competition between the railway administrations, which until 1875 were often 
private, was superseded by the idea of joint accumulation of advantages, and by the 
understanding that co-operation and mutual permeability for railway traffic would 
increase profit opportunities for every single railway company. After extending the 
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territorial network, regional networks were condensed by improving local traffic, 
which connected suburban and rural areas with long-distance transport. Commu-
ters were able to work in town, but live in the countryside where they could carry 
out subsistence farming and participate in rurallife. Hybrid forms of living and co-
existence were more common in everyday life than clear separations. 
This was not only true for the railway system, but for commerce and communication 
in general, and for economic and political spaces that recast themselve by networking 
instead of remaining local. In the entry debate on 21 January 1871, several anti-Prussian 
Catholic patriots from Bavaria decided in favor of an entry to the Reich. A decision 
against it would possibly have caused a secession ofFranconia and the Palatinate on the 
left bank of the Rhine. In order to preserve the Kingdom of Bavaria in its form of 1871, it 
was therefore necessary to join the Reich. A similar connection between preserving 
autonomy on the one hand, and entering a larger unit on the other, is characteristic for 
several Eastern European countdes in their entry to the European Union.7° 
Federalism was more than just a way of distributing authority throughout the federal 
states in order to preserve the union. The federalist model deeply affected society. It 
organized social task sharing, distributed entitlement claims and gave society a federal 
structure. The German nation state of 1871 did not supersede regions and single states. 
Instead, regions and nation states reconstituted themselves mutually: partly against 
each other, partly tagether in the process of joint accumulation of advantages. At the 
same time, new regional references emerged, as was shown by the modern terms 'South 
and West Germany' used in German transport planning during the late nineteenth 
century. Both nation and region-having previously been antagonists in the fight for 
the nation state before 1867-changed their self-perception. After 1871, the nation did 
not mean exclusion of the 'outside,' but 'downward protection' against the socialists. At 
the same time, the region was modernized once specific 'modern forms of attributing 
characteristics, exclusions and roles' had found expression through the nation.71 From 
now on, to be a Bavarian or a Saxon was the precondition for being a German. 
13.5 THE KAISERREICH AS A SYSTEM OF 
CIRCUMVENTED DECISIONS 
The Kaiserreich was full of contradictions and open from the start as to its long-term 
possibilities. The Reich was a monarchy, but with a democratically elected parliament. 
It was a federal state with developed parties operating nationwide. It represented the 
rule of law (Rechtsstaat), but one in which important areas such as the military 
operated in a legal vacuum and were entirely under royal control. Although the 
Reichstag held budgetary power, most public spending was accounted for by the 
army and was therefore under the authority of the crown. The approaches of 
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integration were too contradictory and too promising at the same time. What was 
commonly labeled as a 'dilatory compromise formula' during the foundation period 
was actually the result of a multitude of previous conflicts.72 The democratic aspects of 
the political order were not hard won from below, but granted from above. The two 
institutions, the Bundesrat and the Reichstag, represented the dual legitimacy of the 
Kaiserreich based on the sovereignty of the rulers and the people. Tensions between 
these institutions were bridged more and more frequently by focusing on internal and 
external enemies, first and foremost through anti-Semitism and anti-socialism. 
The high level of integration in the Kaiserreich was in no small part the result of co-
occurring, but systemically unconnected conflicts. In this way, different forms of 
appropriation of the Kaiserreich emerged: there was a monarchic and authoritarian 
Kaiserreich parallel to a democratic and egalitarian one. When different groups recalled 
the foundation of the Empire, they meant different things. Many years later, it was the 
National Socialists who were able to appeal to both: to the authoritarian qualities of the 
Kaiserreich and its promise of democratic participation. 
[Translated from German by Christine Brocks.] 
NoTES 
1. Cf. Achille Darmaing, Relation complete du sacre de Charles X (Paris: Communication & 
Tradition, 1996 [Paris 1825]), 94. 
2. Jan Andres and Matthias Schwcngclbeck, 'Das Zeremoniell als politischer Kommunika-
tionsraum: Inthronizationsfeiern in Preußen im "langen" 19. Jahrhundert,' in Ute Frevert 
and Heinz-Gerhard Haupt (eds), Neue Politikgeschichte. Perspektiven einer historischen 
Politikforschung (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2005), 27-81. 
3. Quoted in: Wolfgang Neugebauer (ed.), Handbuch der Preußischen Geschichte. Vol. 3. 
Vom Kaiserreich zum 20. Jahrhundert und Große Themen der Geschichte Preußens 
(Berlin: de Gruyter, 2ooo), 277. 
4· Cf. Heinrich von Treitschke, 'Unsere Aussichten,' in Preußische Jahrbücher 44 (1879), 
559-576. Even Treitschke's political opponent Theodor Mommsen advocated assimila-
tion. Cf. Theodor Mommsen, Auch ein Wort über unser Judenthum (Berlin: Weidmann, 
188o). On the so called 'debate on Anti-Semitism' cf. Uffa Jensen, Gebildete Doppelgänger. 
Bürgerliche Juden und Protestanten im 19. Jahrhundert (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & 
Ruprecht, 2005), 197-268. 
5. Cf. Armin Heinen, 'Umstrittene Moderne. Die Liberalen und der preußisch-deutsche 
Kulturkampf,' Geschichte und Gesellschaft 29 (2003), 138-160, 149. 
6. On the historiography of the culture war cf. the earlier studies of Rudolf Lill, 'Die Wende 
im Kulturkampf,' Quellen und Forschungen aus italienischen Archiven und Bibliotheken 
50 (1971), 227-283, 52; 49 (1972), 657-730; id., 'Der Kulturkampf in Preußen und im 
Deutschen Reich (bis 1878).'; 'Die Beilegung des Kulturkampfes in Preußen und im 
Deutschen Reich,' in Hubert Jedin (ed.), Handbuch der Kirchengeschichte, vol. VI/2 (Freiburg: 
Herder, 1973), 28-48, 59-78; and Helmut Wals er Smith, German Nationalism and Religious 
Conflict. Culture, Ideology, Politics 1870-1914 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); 
Heii1en, 'Umstrittene Moderne.' 
302 SIEGFRIED WEICHLEIN 
7· Cf. Celia Applegate, 'A Europe of Regions. Reflections on the Historiography of Sub-
National Places in Modern Times,' American Historical Review 104 (1999), 1157-1182. 
8. Cf. primarily the studies of Stein Rokkan. Stein Roldcan, State Formation, Nation Building 
and Mass Politics in Europe. The Theory ojStein Rokkan, based on his collected Worlcs, ed. 
Peter Flora (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). 
9. On the European dimension of culture wars cf. Christopher Clark and Wolfram Kaiser 
(eds), Culture Wars. Secular-Catholic Conjlict in Nineteenth Century Europe (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
10. Cf. the fundamental study by David Blackbourn, Marpingen: Apparitions of the Virgin 
Mary in Nineteenth-Century Germany (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1994). 
11. Cf. Gerhard Lehmbruch, 'Der unitarische Bundesstaat. Pfadabhängigkeit und Wandel, 
Max Planck Institut für Geschichte,' Discussion paper 02/2, Cologne 2002. 
12. Cf. on this issue Andreas Biefang, Die andere Seite der Macht. Reichstag und Öffentlichkeit 
im 'System Bismarck' 1871-1890 (Düsseldorf: Droste, 2009), 38-41. 
13. Cf. Immanuel Kant, 'Der Streit der Fakultäten,' in id. Werke, vol. 9, Schriften zur 
Anthropologie, Geschichtsphilosophie, Politik und Pädagogik, ed. Wilhelm Weisehedei 
(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1964), 265-393, quote 361. 
14. A detailed description in Jürgen Müller, Deutscher Bund und deutsche Nation 1848-1866 
(Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2005). 
15. Abigail Green, Fatherlands. State-building and Nationhood in Nineteenth Century 
Germany (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2001), 62-92. 
16. Cf. August Ludwig von Rochau, Grundsätze der Realpolitik angewendet auf die staatlichen 
Zustände Deutschlands (Stuttgart: Göpel, 1853). 
17· Cf. Biefang, Die andere Seite der Macht, 38-41. 
18. Cf. Thorsten Gudewitz, 'Performing the Nation. The Schiller Centenary Celebrations of 
1859 and the Media,' European Review of History 15 (2oo8), 587-601. 
19. Cf. Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann, Die Politik der Geselligkeit. Freimaurerlogen in der 
deutschen Bürgergesellschaft 1840-1918 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2000). 
20. Cf. Ralf Roth, 'Liberalismus in Frankfurt am Main. Probleme seiner Strukturgeschichte,' 
in Dieter Langewiesehe and LotbarGall (eds), Liberalismus und Region. Zur Geschichte 
des deutschen Liberalismus im 19. Jahrhundert (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1995), 41-86, 64f. 
21. Cf. Dieter Langewiesche, '"Staat" und "Kommune". Zum Wandel der Staatsaufgaben in 
Deutschland im 19. Jahrhundert,' Historische Zeitschrift 248 (1989), 620-635. 
22. Langewiesche, '"Staat" und "Kommune".' 
23. Cf. Beate-Carola Padtberg, Rheinischer Liberalismus in Köln während der politischen 
Reaktion in Preußen nach 1848/49 (Cologne: Rheinisch-Westfalisches Wirtschaftsarchiv 
in Cologne, 1985). On Frankfurt am Main cf. Jan Palmowski, Urban Liberalism in 
Imperial Germany 1866-1914 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). 
24. Cf. Hans-Peter Ullmann, Interessenverbände in Deutschland (Frankfurt am Main.: Suhrkamp, 
1988 ); Andreas Biefang, Politisches Bürgertum in Deutschland 1857~ 1868. Nationale Organiza-
tionen und Eliten (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1994), on the 'Kongress deutscher Vollcswirte' 49ff., on 
the 'Deutscher Handelstag' 207ff., on the 'Deutscher Abgeordnetentag' 221ff. 
25. The magazine 'Gartenlaube' has become one ofthe most popular objects ofhistorical and 
literary research. Cf. among others Kirsten Belgum, Popularizing the Nation. Audience, 
Representation, and the Production of Identity in Die Gartenlaube, 1853-1900 (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1998); Marcus Kuch, Nationale Identität im Prozess 
NATION STATE, CONFLICT RESOLUTION, AND CULTURE WAR, 1850-1878 303 
nationalstaatlicher Orientierung, dargestellt am Beispiel Deutschlands durch die Analyse 
der Familienzeitschrift 'Die Gartenlaube' von 1853-1890 (Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 2003). 
26. Cf. Biefang, Politisches Bürgertum, 15. 
27. Cf. Lothar Gall, 'Liberalismus und bürgerliche Gesellschaft Zu Charakter und Entwick-
lung der liberalen Bewegung in Deutschland,' Historische Zeitschrift 220 (1975), 324-356. 
28. On the changes ofliberalism cf. Karl Rohe, Wahlen und Wählertraditionen in Deutschland. 
Kulturelle Grundlagen deutscher Parteien und Parteiensysteme im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert 
(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1992), 54ff. On the concept of the "federative nation" 
cf. Dieter Langewiesehe u. Georg Schmidt (eds.), Föderative Nation. Deutschlandkonzepte 
von der Reformation bis zum Ersten Weltkrieg (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2ooo). 
29. On this point see Thomas Mergel, 'Zwischen Klasse und Konfession.' Katholisches Bürgertum 
im Rheinland, 1794-1914 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1994). 
30. Cf. on this issue still Gustav Mayer, 'Die Trennung der proletarischen von der bürger-
lichen Demokratie, 1863-1870,' in Hans-Ulrich Wehler (ed.), Radikalismus, Sozialismus 
und bürgerliche Demokratie (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1969 [1912]), 108-178; Jürgen 
Kocka, 'Die Trennung von bürgerlicher und proletarischer Demokratie im europäischen 
Vergleich. Fragestellungen und Ergebnisse,' in id., Jurgen Kocka (ed.), Europäische 
Arbeiterbewegungen im 19- Jahrhundert. Deutschland, Österreich, England und Frankreich 
im Vergleich (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1983), 5-20. 
31. On the discussion of this point cf. Thomas W elskopp, Das Banner der Brüderlichkeit. Die 
deutsche Sozialdemokratie vom Vormärz bis zum Sozialistengesetz (Bonn: Dietz, 2ooo). 
32. Cf. Norbert Busch, Katholische Frömmigkeit und Moderne. Zur Sozial- und Mentalitäts-
geschichte des Herz-Jesu-Kultes in Deutschland zwischen Kulturkampf und Erstem Welt-
krieg (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 1997). 
33. Ursula Nothelle-Wildfeuer, 'Wilhelm Emmanuel von Ketteler, 1811-1877,' in Bernd 
Heidenreich (ed.), Politische Theorien des 19. Jahrhunderts, vol. 3 (Wiesbaden: Hessische 
Landeszentrale für Politische Bildung, 2ooo), 275-294. 
34. On the alliance between conservative monarchy and ultramontanism cf. Jonathan Sperber, 
Popular Catholicism in Nineteenth-Century Germany (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1984). 
35. Heinrich Denzinger and Peter Hünermann, Kompendium der Glaubensbekenntnisse und 
kirchlichen Lehrentscheidungen (Freiburg: Herder, 1991), 809. 
36. Cf. Siegfried Weichlein, 'Religion und Nation: Bonifatius als politischer Heiliger im 19. 
und 20. Jahrhundert,' Schweizerische Zeitschrift zur Religions- und Kulturgeschichte 100 
(2oo6), 45- 58. 
37. Cf. Siegfried Weichlein, 'Pfarrhaus,' in: Hubert Wolf and Christoph Markschies (eds), 
Erinnerungsorte des Christentums (Munich: Beck, 2010). 
38. Cf. Clark and Kaiser, Culture Wars. 
39. Cf. Wolfgang Petter, 'Die Roonsche Heeresorganization und das Ende der Landwehr,' in 
Peter Baumgart (ed.), Die Preußische Armee zwischen Ancien Regime und Reichsgrün-
dung (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2008), 215-228. 
4°· Dieter Langewiesche, Liberalism in Germany (Basingstoke: MaCinillan Press, 2000), 91. 
41· Cf. Otto Pflanze, Bismarck. Der Reichsgründer, trans. Peter Hahlbrock (Munich: Beck, 1997). 
42· Cf. Claude Levi-Strattss, Strukturale Anthropologie, vol. 2 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhr-
kamp, 1992), 165f. 
304 SIEGFRIED WEICHLEIN 
43· Wilhelm Schüßler, (ed.), Otto von Bismarclc, Reden, 1847-1869, in: Hermann von Peters-
dorff (ed.) Bismarclc: Die gesammelten Werke, vol. 10 (Berlin: Otto Stolberg, 1924-1935), 
139-140. 
44. Georg Meyer and Gerhard Anschütz, Lehrbuch des Deutschen Staatsrechts (Munich: 
Duncker & Humblot, 1919), 906. 
45· Cf. the summary in Michael Epkenhans, 'Einigung durch "Eisen und Blut". Militär-
geschichte im Zeitalter der Reichsgründung 185-1871,' in Karl-Volker Neugebauer (ed.), 
Grundkurs deutsche Militärgeschichte Bd. 1: Die Zeit bis 1914. Vom Kriegshaufen zum 
Massenheer (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2006), 302-377. 
46. Dieter Langewiesche, Nationalismus im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert: zwischen Partizipation 
und Aggression (Bann: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 1994), 13. 
47· Stenographischer Bericht über die Verhandlungen des preußischen Abgeordnetenhauses 
1863/1864, vol. 1, 207; quoted in: Heinrich August Winlder, Preußischer Liberalismus 
und deutscher Nationalstaat. Studien zur Geschichte der Deutschen Fortschrittspartei 
1861-1866 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1964), 44· 
48. Cf. Hermann Baumgarten, Der deutsche Liberalismus. Eine Selbstkritik (Berlin: Georg 
Reimer, 1866). 
49. Lehmbruch, Der unitarische Bundesstaat, 19, 18-21. 
so. Details in Erich J. Hahn, Rudolf von Gneist. Ein politischer Jurist in der Bismarclczeit 
(Frankfurt am Main.: Klostermann, 1995), 121ff. 
51. Friedrich C. Sell, Die Tragödie des deutschen Liberalismus (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlag-
sanstalt, 1953). 
52. On the elections of the constituent Reichstag of the North German Confederation see 
Klaus Erich Pollmann, Parlamentarismus im Norddeutschen Bund 1867-1870 (Düsseldorf: 
Droste Verlag, 1985), 93-154. 
53. Margaret Lavinia Anderson, Practicing Democracy. Elections and Political Culture in 
Imperial Germany (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2ooo), 4. 
54. Thomas Nipperdey, Deutsche Geschichte 1866-1918, 2 vols (Munich: Beck, 1992), 108. 
55. Friedrich Engels, Introduction of 'Klassenkämpfe in Frankreich 1848 bis 1850' [1895] in 
Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Werke, vol. 22 (Berlin: Dietz, 1972), 509-527, 516. 
56. Quote in: Anderson, Practicing Democracy, 402. 
57· Michael Zürn, 'Die Politik wandert aus,' Die Zeit, No. 13 (25 March 2010), 15. 
58. Anderson, Practicing Democracy, 417. 
59· Cf. Christoph Schönberger, Das Parlament im Anstaltsstaat. Zur Theorie parlamentar-
ischer Repräsentation in der Staatsrechtslehre des Kaiserreichs (1871-1918), Jus Commune, 
Sonderheft 102 (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1997). 
6o. Biefang, Die andere Seite der Macht. 
61. Andreas Biefang, 'Der Reichstag als Symbol der politischen Nation. Parlament und 
Öffentlichkeit 1867-1890,' in Lothar Gall (ed.), Regierung, Parlament und Öffentlichkeit 
im Zeitalter Bismarclcs. Politikstile im Wandel (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2003), 23-42; 
Robert Arsenschek, Der Kampf um die Wahlfreiheit im Kaiserreich. Zur parlamentar-
ischen Wahlprüfung und politischen Realität der Reichstagswahlen 1871-1914 (Düsseldorf: 
Droste, 2003); Anderson, Practicing Democracy. 
62. Anderson, Practicing Democracy, 8. 
63. Cf. Rainer M. Lepsius, 'Parteiensystem und Sozialstruktur. Zum Problem der Demokra-
tisierung der deutschen Gesellschaft,' in id., Demokratie in Deutschland ( Göttingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1993), 25-50; Johannes Schauff, Die deutschen Katholileen 
NATION STATE, CONFLICT RESOLUTION, AND CULTURE WAR, 1850-1878 305 
und die Zentrumspartei. Eine politisch-statistische Untersuchung der Reichstagswahlen seit 
1871 (Mainz: Matthias-Grünewald-Verlag, 1975 [Cologne: Bachern, 1928]). 
64. Cf. Siegfried Weichlein, Sozialmilieus und politische Kultur in der Weimarer Republik. 
Lebenswelt, Vereinskultur, Politik in Hessen (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1996). 
65. Cf. Rohe, Wahlen und Wählertraditionen, 65. 
66. Cf. Rudolf Morsey, Die oberste Reichsverwaltung unter Bismarck, 1867-1890 (Münster: 
Aschendorff, 1957). 
67. For an overview see Siegfried Weichlein, 'Föderalismus und Bundesstaat zwischen dem 
Alten Reich und der Bundesrepublik,' in Ines Härte! (ed.), Handbuch Föderalismus-
interdisziplinär. Föderalismus als demokratische Rechtsordnung und Rechtskultur in 
Deutschland, Buropa und der Welt (Berlin: Springer Verlag, 2011). 
68. Cf. Weichlein, Nation und Region, Integrationsprozesse im Kaiserreich (Düsseldorf: 
Droste, 2004), 235ff. 
69. Id., Nation und Region. 371ff.; Wolfgang Hardtwig, 'Nation-Region-Stadt. Strukturmerk-
male des deutschen Nationalismus und lokale Denkmalskulturen,' in Gurrther Mai (ed.), 
Das Kyjjhäuser-Denkma/1896-1996. Ein nationales Monument im europäischen Kontext 
(Cologne: Böhlau, 1997), 54-84. 
70. Cf. Alan S. Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation State (London/New York: 
Routledge, 1992); Siegfried Weichlein, 'Europa und der Föderalismus. Zur Begriffs-
geschichte politischer Ordnungsmodelle,' Historisches Jahrbuch 125 (2005), 133-152. 
71. Cf. Rüdiger Gans, 'Das Siegerland zwischen ländlicher Beschränkung und nationaler 
Entgrenzung. Enge und Weite als Elemente regionaler Identität,' in Rolf Lindner (ed.), 
Die Wiederkehr des Regionalen. Über neue Formen kultureller Identität (Frankfurt am 
Main.: Campus, 1994), 64-90, 72, 74. 
72. Cf. Wolfgang J. Mommsen, 'A Delaying Compromise. The Imperial Constitution of 1871,' 
in id. (ed.), Imperial Germany 1867-1918. Politics, Culture and Society in an Authoritarian 
State (London: Arnold, 1995), 20-40. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
ANDERSON, MARGARET LAVINIA, Practicing Democracy: Elections and Political Culture in 
Imperial Germany (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2ooo). 
BmFANG, ANDREAS, Die andere Seite der Macht, Reichstag und Öffentlichkeit im 'System 
Bismarck' 1871-1890 (Düsseldorf: Droste, 2009). 
-Politisches Bürgertum in Deutschland 1857-1868. Nationale Organisationen und Eliten 
(Düsseldorf: Droste, 1994). 
BLACKBOURN, DAvm, Marpingen: Apparitions of the Virgin Mary in Nineteenth-Century 
Germany (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1994). 
BuscH, NoRBERT, Katholische Frömmigkeit und Moderne. Zur Sozial- und Mentalitäts-
geschichte des Herz-Jesu-Kultes in Deutschland zwischen Kulturkampf und Erstem Weltkrieg 
(Gütersloh: Güthersloher Verlagshaus, 1997). 
GREEN, AnrGAIL, Fatherlands. State-building and Nationhood in Nineteenth Century 
Germany (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
306 SIEGFRIED WEICHLEIN 
LANGEWIBSCHE, DIBTER, Liberalism in Germany (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 2ooo). 
-- and LoTRAR GALL (eds), Liberalismus und Region. Zur Geschichte des deutschen 
Liberalismus im 19- Jahrhundert (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1995). 
LEPSIUs, RAINER M., Demokratie in Deutschland ( Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1993). 
PALMOWSKI, }AN, Urban Liberalism in Imperial Germany 1866-1914 (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1999). 
SMITH, HELMUT WALSER, German Nationalism and Religious Conflict. Culture, Ideology, 
Politics 1870-1914 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995). 
WmcHLEIN, SIBGFRIBD, Nation und Region. Integrationsprozess im Bismarckreich (Düssel-
dorf: Droste Verlag, 2004). 
WELSKOPP, THOMAs, Das Banner der Brüderlichkeit. Die deutsche Sozialdemokratie vorn 
Vormärz bis zum Sozialistengesetz (Bonn: Dietz, 20oo). 
